

ADDRESS BY  
GENERAL C. P. CABELL, USAF  
THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
81st CONFERENCE OF  
THE NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES  
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS  
6 OCTOBER 1959 -- 2 P.M. CST

"SITUATION REPORT "

It is my pleasure to join with the 81st Conference of the National Guard Association and to have an opportunity to meet your officers and all of you here. Citizen-soldiers, like yourselves, are in a particularly good position to grasp the nature and significance of the events of our time in terms of both their military and non-military aspects. Historically, the National Guard is representative of the fundamental principle that our people have the right to defend themselves and their homes, individually and collectively, against any aggressor. This right reaches beyond physical protection alone. It reaches to the defense of freedoms and concepts upon which this Nation, its cities and states, have developed and prospered.

Today's defense, and the struggle in which we are all involved, is demanded by the threat which is posed by International

Communism. The Communists are active from their subversive bases throughout the world in their effort to destroy and replace cherished ideals of free men with a dictatorial system of force, corruption and serfdom. The evidence of the variety of Communist methods and techniques, ranging from smiling faces to mass murder, has often been carried in world news reports. Communist acts cannot be lightly dismissed as being of no consequence because they happened a month, a year, or three years ago, and to someone else's country. There can be no room for complacency or forgetfulness.

Today, I am appearing before you as an Intelligence Officer. It is my intent to give you a brief situation report, and in it, to give as examples -- and let me emphasize "as examples" -- two trouble areas in the world where Communist activities clearly document their aims.

The first example is the small country of Laos which is today in the news because of Communist aggressive activity there. Suppose we take a close look at the situation in this seldom heard of country. Laos first appeared on the maps of American front pages in the spring of 1954, in connection with the Indochina War,

and the fall of the fortress of Dien Bien Phu in northwest Vietnam. Dien Bien Phu is six and one-half miles from the frontier of Laos. You may recall that a few weeks before the siege of Dien Bien Phu, a Communist military force had moved into northern Laos. For a time the French, who were responsible for Laos' defense, expected this Communist force to move on Luang Prabang. As it turned out, the main Communist force withdrew from Laos, in order to take part in the attack on Dien Bien Phu. Then the Indochina War ended with the Conference at Geneva. But the record shows that Communist agitators, organizers, and guerrillas, in traditional fashion, remained behind in the northern provinces of Laos, to bolster a Laotian Communist group known as the Pathet Lao.

Thus, at the end of the Indochina War in 1954, the Communist Pathet Lao forces were in generally effective control of two rugged and sparsely populated northern provinces in Laos -- Phong Saly and Sam Neua. These are the provinces that we are reading most about in our newspapers today.

By 1957, the Pathet Lao felt they were ready to make their move, via the political route, to control the whole country. They then made an agreement with the Laotian Government for the

unification of these two provinces under the Laotian Government authority. It was also agreed that Pathet Lao units would be integrated into the Lao Army.

Bolstered by American aid and advice, the Laotian Government gradually strengthened its authority. It made at least a small beginning in the reeducation of the two nearly lost provinces away from Communist influence, and away from their original trade ties with <sup>North</sup> Vietnam now under Communist domination.

Why have the Communists decided at this time to abandon their chief reliance upon political methods, and have reintroduced guerrilla warfare in Laos? It seems that the Laotian Government's efforts to create a viable, free state have been showing too much progress. The United States aid and the Laotian Government's efforts to build roads and improve communications facilities, etc. had begun to take hold. Rather than to see that continue, the Communists have had to make this change in tactics. They probably believe that activation of guerrilla warfare in Laos offers to them some prospect -- at low risk -- of promoting Communist objectives in Laos, even if the Laotian Government receives substantial moral and materiel help from the outside. The method is not new. When a

legal majority in the Parliament approved a cabinet without Communist representation, the Communists turned to direct interference via the guerrilla and subversive route. A little shooting, even if it is out of key with their current theme of "peaceful coexistence", is consistent with Communist doctrine.

From the Communists' standpoint, Laos presents an ideal theater of operation. It has 800 miles of northern and eastern border with Communist territory. It stands as a bridge between the countries of Communist imperialism and those free Southeast Asian countries who themselves are valiantly struggling under great odds to retain their own political and economic systems. The northern part of Laos is fantastically rugged. It is sparsely populated. Most of the people live in small, isolated villages connected only by foot-trails and waterways, principally one great river, the Mekong. The few roads that do exist are little more than jeep trails (and with very few jeeps to use on them). On the other hand, the supply routes into Laos from Hanoi in North Vietnam, and from Dien Bien Phu, are considerably better than from the Laotian capital, Vientiane. Air facilities are also limited and in most instances, are highly marginal, particularly in the monsoon period now about to end.

Beyond the geographic aspects of the problem, there are the social, ethnic and political situations which offer favorable opportunities for Communist guerrilla and psychological warfare. The people of Lao stock make up only about half of the population of the country. These are primarily concentrated in Vientiane and Luang Prabang. The population in those areas where currently the guerrillas are most active is largely made up of hill tribes and ethnic groups who have not yet learned to identify themselves with the central government. The common people of Laos, especially those in the villages, are unorganized, superstitious and highly susceptible to rumor, propaganda, and intimidation.

The Communists, fully aware of these facts, have launched a psychological warfare program. Under the conditions stated, this is highly effective in increasing the scope of armed aggression. For example, through rumor and planted stories, a small village of Laotians receives the word that a strong Communist force is about to descend upon it. The defenseless villagers are scared and they vacate, running for their lives, screaming for help from the Laotian Government. Now in many instances no such attacking force is near that village. But, as soldiers, you can readily

appreciate the fact that this rumor seemed real to the panicky villagers and to Laotian troop headquarters. The resulting confusion then supports the impression which the Communist propaganda line is pushing -- that is, that there is really no problem in Laos. Frequently, when observers reach the scene of the false alarms and reports of battle, they find no evidence of battle because no real battle took place.

However, the Communists have supplied arms to a Laotian guerrilla force of several thousand. The force has been organized and trained largely on the Communist North Vietnam side of the border. As the occasion suits, the Communists order an attack on the isolated Laotian Army posts in the border area.

These Laotian army posts are manned by troops, a great number of whom are not native to the heavily-wrinkled terrain of the north. Little advanced intelligence of an attack by the Communists is available to the Laotian commanders. In fact, the Communists systematically kill off loyal Laotian citizens whom they suspect of giving information to the Government forces. Under these conditions, the attackers have been most effective in surprise attack. Two or three days after such an attack, word reaches the capital of Vientiane that the post has fallen. These are the communiques which hit our headlines.

Oftentimes when the facts of such an attack are examined, one finds very little evidence of any large-scale fighting. Certainly in the context of the battles of World War II and other battles of history, six or seven artillery holes and two or three casualties cannot be interpreted as a great battle. So, many observers dismiss the reports received from Laos because too many have been exaggerations.

Dismissal of the seriousness of the situation is exactly what the Communists hope to achieve. The fact is, that the loss of even five or six soldiers in a far northern outpost of Laos is important. It is important because it is in fact an aggression made on a free people -- regardless of the size of the casualty list. There <sup>may</sup> ~~will~~ be more and bigger casualty lists to follow. Remember that the first battle of the American Revolution, which took place at Lexington, had only sixteen casualties -- yet the shot was heard round the world.

For the moment, the Communist shooting activity in Laos seems to have lessened somewhat. The Communists do not want United Nations' factfinders who are now there to uncover evidence which would point up the Communists' purpose. Indeed, the



Communist radios of Peiping and Hanoi are launching propaganda attacks, demanding that the United States cease its provocations and dismantle its alleged military bases in Laos. (As a matter of fact, there are no U. S. bases in Laos.) United States aid and technical assistance, and the Government's efforts to build roads and facilities are twisted into imperialist plotting to "exploit" the riches of Laos. The Communists, using their standard technique, repeatedly deny any involvement in Laos. They call the situation merely a "civil war". But as I have said, we know that the Communists have clandestinely supplied weapons and trained agitators, and are master-minding the operation.

What of the other free countries bordering Laos? Of course they are disturbed. In the wake of Tibet, they are uneasy. They are sympathetic with the Laotian Government. Burma, which itself has miles of territory bordering huge Communist China, is much concerned with the implications of the Communist activity in Laos. They know that tomorrow, Burma could be the object of similar Communist aggression. But under the circumstances, as a fact of life, Burma has to be careful lest she precipitate what at this point is merely a potential aggression to them.

In the Republic of Vietnam, we find a country that itself has just begun to rise from the ravages of the Indochina War. Certainly that government wants to help Laos. But keep in mind, resources in these areas are meager for the tremendous job that has to be done on their domestic front. Any draining of resources from the constructive programs being undertaken by the free Southeast Asian countries, can be of long-term advantage to the Communists. If the Communists by diversion or otherwise can create lack of confidence in government leaders, they will have fertile fields for political and subversive activity. Therefore, a decision by the Republic

of Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand, or Burma to move vigorously in support of Laotian Government forces is weighty and complicated, and can only be made with most careful deliberation of the possible consequences to their own internal economic and political security.

The Communists know this and they have adapted their tactics accordingly. Flexible guerrilla warfare and propaganda for the present keep their risks and costs at a low level, while the risks and costs to the free peoples under attack run high. It is clear then why the Communists have no desire to see United Nations intervention in Laos.

What of the future? We can expect to see Communist guerrilla tactics in Laos extended over a long period of time. They will attempt to use the situation for political bargaining purposes. They will buttress their activity by denials and propaganda charges. They are prepared to continue a prolonged and unresolved struggle. The Communist fire there is smouldering. It must be met with strong determination.

For my second example of the Communist orchestrated, worldwide effort, I should like to turn to Africa.

Perhaps no where in the world today are free nations confronted with a greater challenge than on the African Continent. Africa comprises one-fifth of the land area of the world and includes some 220 million people, speaking over seven hundred different languages and dialects. After centuries of backwardness and relative isolation, Africa today is undergoing a profound political, economic and social transformation.

At the end of World War II, there were only four independent nations in Africa -- Ethiopia, Liberia, the Union of South Africa, and Egypt. Since then, six more have been added -- Libya, Sudan, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, and Guinea. Over the next several years, there are many more in prospect. For example, in 1960 four of the presently dependent territories -- Cameroon, Togoland, Nigeria, Somalia are scheduled to become sovereign.

These African nations are arriving today on the international scene with many serious problems and weaknesses which make them vulnerable to predatory external influences. For example, there is a serious dearth of trained administrators, educators and technicians. Economic underdevelopment is almost universal. Many of the new countries are largely dependent upon one or two cash crops. Everywhere development capital is in extremely short supply relative to need. Once independence has been acquired, the tendency on the political level is toward authoritarian one-party levels, controlled by a dominant elite. Beneath this element lie the rural masses who are illiterate, inarticulate, and still wedded to the old ways.

Communism is not now a large force in Tropical Africa and there is no organized Communist party as such except in Madagascar. However, since 1950 the Communist Bloc has significantly stepped-up its efforts to penetrate the area.

The Communists have set themselves the task of persuading and influencing the emerging political movements in Africa. Apparently they have decided for the present against the method of controlling this movement through the creating of mass indigenous, Communist parties. Instead, the Communists are concentrating on a program of infiltration into national parties, such as the United Peoples Congress

Party in the Cameroons, the African Independence Party in Senegal, or infiltrating extremists groups formed within such parties. In this way they are able to hide the Communist objectives under the cloak of African nationalism. In this approach, the Communists are concentrating on a program to detach existing and emerging independent nations of Africa from their economic and political ties to the West. The next step is to make them dependent upon the Bloc.

In their approach to African problems, the Communists enjoy the initial advantage of not having been involved physically in Africa. They can make their offers of support and assistance without having to bear comparisons with past performances. On the other hand, Western powers which undertake development projects in Africa, tend to be regarded by Africans as simply serving their own interests while offers and promises of the Communist Bloc are taken as gracious generosity. Furthermore, the Communists try to pass off their standard propaganda line that they, too, were recently underdeveloped countries which through the Communist method have pulled themselves up into the front ranks of industrial and political power.

The Soviet Union is clearly preparing for action in Africa. Since 1950, considerable study and research has been underway in various academies and institutes of the Soviet Union and Bloc countries.

An increasing number of publicized studies on Africa, some of real scientific value, have been forthcoming from Soviet Government study programs. Introduction of a wide range of university courses and the stepped-up preparation of instructors in African subjects have been underway at Moscow, Leningrad, and Prague universities. Language training in such languages as Youraba, Congo and Luba, has become a fixed part of the curriculum. The aim is clearly to create a nucleus of Soviet experts on Africa and to equip Communist engineers and scientists with the necessary knowledge for work in Africa. Standard among such training is included the techniques and methods of propaganda and subversion.

Along side of this expansion of research and training of Communist Bloc personnel goes the Communist attempt to prepare individual Africans as instruments for the spread of Communist influences. African students are offered scholarships to the Soviet Union and satellite countries. Increasing numbers of Africans are invited to visit behind the Iron Curtain and growing numbers of goodwill visits and missions to Communist countries are being arranged. Contacts with Africans studying in France, the United Kingdom, India and other Western countries are being made by the Communists in an effort to indoctrinate and influence these future African leaders and

members of the intelligentsia to the ways of Communism. Many of these students have received free trips behind the Iron Curtain and when they return to Africa they tend to extol Marxism, although few thus far have returned as disciplined Communists.

The traditional technique of using Communist front organizations, such as the International Union of Students and the World Federation of Trade Unions, is employed to invite private individuals to attend Communist gatherings such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference and the Vienna Youth Festival. In this way, the Communists have been able to have private individuals from Africa attending the conferences, even when their own governments declined to be represented officially. Such tactics give the Communist gatherings an air of worldwide Communist support and also expose these individuals to further Communist propaganda and indoctrination.

The Communists are also using broadcasting as a major tool in their program of penetration of Africa. Moscow broadcasts in French and English on high-powered, shortwave transmitters, are beamed to Africa. These broadcasts which began in 1958, are gradually increasing. Last month Peiping also began English broadcasting to Africa, employing two very high-powered, shortwave transmitters.

On the diplomatic front, in order to facilitate contacts with Africans, the Soviet Union has large embassies at Addis Ababa, Khartoum, Tripoli and Rabat. It also has opened numerous trade missions throughout Africa. Other Communist Bloc countries have diplomatic and economic representation where there are no Soviet representatives.

For the immediate future, the most obvious method of Communist penetration on the African scene will be through the use of the economic weapon -- that is, provision of financial aid, trade with the Bloc, and arms. The impact of this is tremendous upon the newly developing nations of that continent -- who today are finding themselves the beneficiaries of an undreamed of attention.

One of the most significant economic ventures by the Soviet Bloc toward Africa has been that made to Ethiopia. Here this small country has become the recipient of \$100 million credit from the Soviet Union and a \$20 million loan from Czechoslovakia. Ethiopia possesses no comprehensive development plan to guide the expansion of its economy. Like many other African countries, the Ethiopians are handicapped by the shortage of administrative and technical skills necessary to draw up and supervise such a plan.

Now the Soviet Union is fully cognizant of the inabilities of African governments to make the dramatic and required institutional



changes that would seem necessary to properly use the Soviet credits. And indeed, they have undoubtedly forecast this situation and are standing ready to help by sending in trained administrators, technicians, organizers and technical assistants. Once the Communists have been able to establish themselves inside of a country and made that country dependent upon the Soviet Union or the Bloc, for its economic livelihood, by that one step they will have significantly weakened the position of the country as a national sovereign state in world affairs. Even more important, traditional free institutional development may be replaced by Communist organizations, headed by Communist-controlled stooges.

The effects of this kind of a situation were not welcomed or appreciated by the peoples of Hungary and Tibet. And I think the illustrations in the cases of those two countries sufficiently documents the killing effect that Communism has on the freedom of individual people and individual dignity.

I could go on in much detail concerning other aspects of the identification of the Communist attack and penetration of the newly emerging continent of Africa, but time will not permit.

I have selected Laos and Africa as two typical examples of how Communism is operating. It would have been possible to pick any

number of places and give you similar factual coverage. In Laos and in Africa, we are not talking theoretically, nor are we discussing them in an alarmist way. What I have done is to cite the facts which I believe show the unceasing efforts on the part of the Communists, not only to hold what they have, but steadily to expand their area of control.

To the free peoples of the West, the bold evidence of Communist aggression is not very palatable. Calling this "peaceful coexistence" does not make much sense to me.

Abraham Lincoln once said, quote: "Suppose we call the tail of a sheep a leg. In this case, how many legs does a sheep have?" "Five", his audience answered. "You are wrong", replied Lincoln, "because even if we call the tail of a sheep a leg, it will not become a leg."

\* \* \*